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Abstract. In most RLWE-based homomorphic encryption schemes the
native plaintext elements are polynomials in a rting Zt[x]/(xn+1), where
n is a power of 2, and t an integer modulus. For performing integer
or rational number arithmetic, one typically uses an encoding scheme
which converts the inputs to polynomials, and allows the result of the
homomorphic computation to be decoded to recover the result as an
integer or rational number, respectively. The problem is that the modulus
t often needs to be extremely large to prevent the plaintext polynomial
coefficients from being reduced modulo t during the computation, which
is a requirement for the decoding operation to work correctly. This results
in larger noise growth, and prevents the evaluation of deep circuits, unless
the encryption parameters are significantly increased.
We combine a trick of Hoffstein and Silverman, where the modulus t is
replaced by a polynomial x− b, with the Fan-Vercauteren homomorphic
encryption scheme. This yields a new scheme with a very convenient
plaintext space Z/(bn + 1)Z. We then show how rational numbers can be
encoded as elements of this plaintext space, enabling homomorphic eval-
uation of deep circuits with high-precision rational number inputs. We
perform a fair and detailed comparison to the Fan-Vercauteren scheme
with the Non-Adjacent Form encoder, and find that the new scheme sig-
nificantly outperforms this approach. For example, when the new scheme
allows us to evaluate circuits of depth 9 with 32-bit integer inputs, in the
same parameter setting the Fan-Vercauteren scheme only allows us to go
up to depth 2. We conclude by discussing how known applications can
benefit from the new scheme.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Fully homomorphic encryption enables Boolean or arithmetic circuits to be eval-
uated on encrypted data, without requiring access to the secret key. While the
idea is old [40], the existence of such encryption schemes was an open problem
for decades, and was solved only in 2009 by Craig Gentry [24], with an explicit
construction based on ideal lattices. While the scheme of [24] was impractical, a
long list of vastly more efficient schemes have since emerged [12, 11, 22, 9, 26].
Several lines of research have focused on improving the efficiency of homo-
morphic encryption for practical tasks, e.g. by improving the data representa-
tions [38, 25, 41, 21, 16], and by providing clever optimization tricks to improve
the performance of existing schemes both from a theoretical [25, 30] and a soft-
ware engineering [37, 30] point of view.
All of the schemes mentioned above have several features in common. For
example, their security is based on the hardness of either the Learning With Er-
rors (LWE) [39] or the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE) [36] problem, which
makes the plaintext and ciphertext spaces to be very similar in all of the schemes.
Another commonality is that in each scheme every ciphertext comes with an in-
herent attribute called noise, which accumulates in homomorphic operations—
in particular in multiplications—and corrupts the ciphertext once it reaches a
certain maximum value. Once a ciphertext is corrupted, it can no longer be de-
crypted, even with the correct secret key. Gentry [24] used a clever bootstrapping
procedure to re-encrypt a homomorphically encrypted ciphertext under a second
layer of encryption, by evaluating the decryption circuit homomorphically using
the encryptions of the bits of the secret key. While there has been a lot of work
recently towards making bootstrapping more practical [18, 6], and improving
it further is certainly an interesting direction for future work, typically a more
efficient solution is to simply increase the parameters of the encryption scheme
to allow deep enough circuits to be evaluated before the noise ceiling is reached.
This approach—called leveled (fully) homomorphic encryption [5]—has been re-
markably successful: most implementations of homomorphic encryption do not
implement bootstrapping, and most papers discussing applications do not use
it. In this paper we focus on the leveled approach.
In most schemes based on the RLWE assumption, the natural plaintext ele-
ments are polynomials in a ring Rt = Zt[x]/Φm(x), where Φm denotes the m-th
cyclotomic polynomial. For security and performance reasons it is common to
restrict m to be a power of 2, in which case Φ2n(x) is of the form x
n + 1. Thus,
homomorphic operations performed on ciphertexts reflect on the plaintext side
as additions and multiplications in the ring Rt. This is extremely unnatural for
nearly all naturally occurring applications, as in practice we often want to per-
form operations on encrypted integers and rational numbers. For this reason, an
encoding of elements of Z or Q into polynomials in Rt is needed. Such an encod-
ing needs to respect both additions and multiplications, and also be injective in
a large domain (subset of Z or Q), so that the results of the computation can
be decoded after decryption. Several encoding methods for integers and rational
numbers have been proposed in the literature [38, 10, 32, 21, 20, 16], but all of
these have a common limitation: the decoding operation will work correctly only
as long as the homomorphic operations do not cause the underlying plaintext
polynomial coefficients to be reduced modulo the integer t. In other words, in
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order for the result to be correct as an integer or as a rational number, t needs
to be set sufficiently large. This issue is brought up and closely studied in [20],
where for a certain family of “regular circuits”, and bit-length of the inputs, the
authors analyze a lower bound for t that ensures a correct decoding. Therefore,
when selecting encryption parameters for applications, one typically needs to not
only make sure that the noise does not overflow, but also that the plaintext poly-
nomial coefficients do not grow too large. This results in a subtle optimization
problem: in order to have no plaintext coefficient wrap-around, we need to choose
a large t, which unfortunately implies faster noise growth (see Section 3.2). We
may need to choose larger parameters overall for the encryption scheme to in-
crease the noise ceiling and to preserve the security level. The consequence of
this is worse performance.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work we tackle the issue of the plaintext polynomial coefficient growth
using a trick that Hoffstein and Silverman suggested in [29] to be used in the con-
text of the NTRU encryption scheme [28]. Namely, they suggested replacing the
modulus t with a small polynomial x− b, for some positive integer b (e.g. b = 2),
turning the plaintext space into the integer quotient ring Z/(bn + 1)Z. In typi-
cal parameter settings suitable for homomorphic encryption, n has size several
thousands, yielding a plaintext space large enough to contain the results of many
naturally occurring computations, without modular reduction ever taking place.
We combine this method with the Fan-Vercauteren (FV) scheme [22], which is
one of the most successful homomorphic encryption schemes to date.
In Section 3 we review the FV scheme, and present heuristic upper bounds
for its noise growth in homomorphic operations. In the process, we use a new
and more convenient definition for noise, which results in simpler analysis, and
more uniform growth properties.
In Section 4 we describe the new (leveled) homomorphic encryption scheme,
prove its correctness, and study its noise growth properties both in terms of
strict and heuristic upper bounds.
In Section 6 we show how to encode rational numbers as integers in the
plaintext space Z/(bn + 1)Z, allowing the new scheme to be used to perform
high-precision rational number arithmetic.
In Section 7 we discuss and the performance of the new scheme. In particu-
lar, we describe a fair and reasonable methodology for comparing it to the FV
scheme. We choose to use the Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) encoder [16] to enable
integer arithmetic in the FV scheme, as it yields some of the best performance
results. We find that the new scheme significantly outperforms this FV-NAF ap-
proach when deep circuits on integers or rational numbers need to be evaluated.
In Section 8 we discuss how certain known applications of homomorphic en-
cryption can benefit from the new scheme. In many cases, the new scheme allows
much smaller parameters to be used, yielding performance, message expansion,
and security level improvements.
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1.3 Related Work
The idea of using the trick of Hoffstein and Silverman [29] in homomorphic
encryption is by no means new: Geihs and Cabarcas [23] applied it in the context
of the Brakerski-Vaikuntanathan (BV) scheme [12]. However, we note that this is
much more straightforward than using it with modern schemes. For convenience,
they used b = 2 in the modulus polynomial x− b, and noted that other choices
might produce useful properties, such as the message space being isomorphic to
a finite field, or isomorphic to a product ring in which one can use the Chinese
Remainder Theorem to encode multiple plaintext integers at once. The same
ideas apply in our setting, and indeed we observed that choosing b appropriately
is critical for achieving the best results with the new scheme.
Lauter et al. [32] apply the idea to YASHE, but only focus on specific appli-
cations. They cite an unpublished work of Lo´pez-Alt and Naehrig [35] for more
details. In contrast, we present a detailed construction, noise growth analysis,
performance evaluation, and comparison to the FV scheme. While [32] only en-
crypts integers, we describe also how to efficiently encrypt rational numbers with
high precision.
There has recently been a lot of interest in the homomorphic encryption
community in encrypting rational numbers more efficiently [4, 17, 7, 21]. Some
researchers have even proposed homomorphic encryption schemes that encrypt
true floating point numbers, while others have proposed technical improvements
to existing schemes, or to previously known encoding methods, to enable more
efficient fixed-precision rational number arithmetic. As encrypted floating point
arithmetic is very unnatural from the point of view of the schemes, it is not
surprising that the latter approaches yield substantially more efficient construc-
tions; indeed, our solution falls into the same category, and can be thought of as
a technical modification to the FV scheme.
Some approaches, such as the work of Cheon et al. [17], have substantially
different properties, which makes a direct comparison less meaningful. For ex-
ample, their scheme allows batching to be used, which results in good amortized
performance in cases where the SIMD capabilities of the scheme can be fully
utilized. However, the latency is much worse than in our scheme. This work also
becomes extremely costly as the desired bit-precision increases, as do others with
similar capabilities (e.g. [4]). In comparison, our scheme can more conveniently
support deep circuits on high-precision inputs without any precision loss, and
with much better computational performance.
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the approaches mentioned above for
homomorphic encryption of integers and rational numbers are difficult to use
in an optimal way, even for experts in the field, due to the large number of
parameters involved in both encrypting and encoding. On the other hand, our
approach has fewer parameters, making it easier to use and to optimize.
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2 Notation
For n a power of 2, we denote R = Z[x]/(xn + 1)—the 2n-th cyclotomic ring
of integers. For an integer a, we denote Ra = R/aR = Za[x]/(xn + 1), and
RQ = R⊗Q = Q[x]/(xn + 1).
For any polynomial in Z[x] (or Q[x]) we denote the infinity norm by ‖ · ‖.
For any polynomial in R (or Ra, R
Q), we always consider the representative
with lowest possible degree. We also encounter the infinity norm in the so-called
canonical embedding [25, 19], and for an polynomial in R (or RQ) denote it
by ‖·‖can. For integers modulo a ∈ Z>0, we always use representatives in the
symmetric interval [−d(a − 1)/2e, b(a − 1)/2c]. For any polynomial in Z[x], [·]a
denotes the coefficient-wise reduction modulo a. For any polynomial in Q[x] we
denote rounding of the coefficients to the nearest integer by b·e.
For any polynomial p ∈ Z[x], and an integer base w, we denote the polynomi-
als in its coefficient-wise base-w decomposition by p(i), where i = 0, . . . , blogw ‖p‖c.
We denote by χ a discrete Gaussian distribution having standard deviation σ,
truncated at some large bound B (e.g. B ≈ 6σ). The computational security
parameter is denoted λ. By log we always mean log2.
Ciphertext elements considered in this work are always pairs of polynomials,
e.g. ct = (c0, c1). For such a pair, and a third polynomial s, we denote ct(s) =
c0 + c1s.
3 Preliminaries
As the new scheme can be thought of as a variant of the Fan-Vercauteren
scheme [22], for the convenience of the reader, we include the definition and
some preliminaries of the FV scheme in the full version [15].
3.1 Noise Fundamentals
As we briefly explained in Section 1.1, every ciphertext in FV carries with itself a
noise component, which grows in homomorphic operations. When using leveled
fully homomorphic encryption schemes, it becomes particularly important to be
able to estimate the noise growth as accurately as possible. This is because only
the party holding the secret key can compute the exact value of the noise, and the
party performing the homomorphic evaluations must estimate the noise growth
to ensure that the ciphertexts will not become corrupted. For the FV scheme, [22]
presents upper bound estimates for noise growth, but these estimates are not very
tight, and cannot be used for determining accurately whether specific parameters
work for a specific computation. Costache and Smart [19] instead study heuristic
upper bounds for the noise growth for a number of schemes, including FV. Such
a heuristic analysis proves to be a powerful tool, yielding much tighter and more
realistic noise growth estimates, and yields reasonable results when used for
determining parameters in the leveled setting.
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In Section 3.2 we will present heuristic noise growth results for the FV scheme,
and in Section 5 both strict and heuristic noise growth bounds a` la Costache-
Smart for the new scheme. In Section 7 we use these heuristic results as a com-
ponent in our comparison of the two schemes.
3.2 Noise in FV
In this section we present (without proof) heuristic upper bounds for noise
growth in the FV scheme. For much more details on the methodology, we refer
the reader to [19, 25].
The definition of noise (invariant noise) that we employ here is the same
that is used in [31], and different from those used in e.g. [22, 33, 19].
Definition 1 (FV invariant noise). Let ct = (c0, c1) be an FV ciphertext
encrypting the message m ∈ Rt. Its invariant noise v ∈ RQ is the polynomial
with the smallest infinity norm such that
t
q
ct(s) =
t
q
(c0 + c1s) = m+ v + at ∈ RQ ,
for some polynomial a ∈ R.
Intuitively, Definition 1 captures the notion that the noise v being rounded
incorrectly is what causes decryption failures in the FV scheme. We see this in
the following lemma, which bounds the coefficients of v.
Lemma 1. An FV ciphertext ct encrypting a message m decrypts correctly, as
long as the invariant noise v satisfies ‖v‖ < 1/2.
Proof. Let ct = (c0, c1). Using the formula for decryption, we have for some
polynomial A:
m′ =
[⌊
t
q
[c0 + c1s]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(c0 + c1s) +At
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
(c0 + c1s)
⌉]
t
.
By the definition of v,m′ = [bm+ v + ate]t = m+bve (mod t). Hence decryption
is successful as long as v is removed by the rounding, i.e. if ‖v‖ < 1/2. uunionsq
The key to obtaining the heuristics is to use the infinity norm in the canonical
embedding, which we call the canonical norm and denote ‖·‖can, instead of the
usual infinity norm. Discussing the canonical norm in detail is beyond the scope
of this paper. The canonical norm is useful due to the following facts.
Lemma 2 ([19, 25]). For any polynomials a, b ∈ RQ,
‖a‖ ≤ ‖a‖can ≤ ‖a‖1 , ‖ab‖can ≤ ‖a‖can ‖b‖can .
If a ∈ RQ has its coefficients sampled independently from a distribution with
standard deviation σcoeff, then ‖a‖can ≤ 6σcoeff
√
n, with very high probability.
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Since the usual infinity norm is always bounded from above by the canoni-
cal norm, it suffices to ensure for correctness that the canonical norm never
reaches 1/2, and therefore in the heuristic estimates all bounds are presented for
the canonical norm of the noise.
The following lemmas can easily be obtained from standard noise growth
arguments for FV [22], combined with Lemma 2. For more details on exactly
how this is done, we refer the reader to [19].
Lemma 3 (FV initial noise heuristic). Let ct be a fresh FV encryption of
a message m ∈ Rt. Let Nm be an upper bound on the number of non-zero terms
in the polynomial m. Let rt(q) denote q−bq/tct, which is a non-negative integer
less than t. The noise v in ct satisfies
‖v‖can ≤ rt(q)
q
‖m‖Nm + 6σt
q
(
4
√
3n+
√
n
)
,
with very high probability.
Lemma 4 (FV addition heuristic). Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts en-
crypting m1,m2 ∈ Rt, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Then the noise
vadd in their sum ctadd satisfies ‖vadd‖can ≤ ‖v1‖can + ‖v2‖can.
Lemma 5 (FV multiplication heuristic). Let ct1 be a ciphertext encrypting
m1 with noise v1, and let ct2 be a ciphertext encrypting m2 with noise v2. Let
Nm1 and Nm2 be upper bounds on the number of non-zero terms in the polyno-
mials m1 and m2, respectively. Then with very high probability, the noise vmult
in the product ctmult satisfies the following bound:
‖vmult‖can ≤
(
2‖m1‖Nm1 + 6tn+ t
√
3n
)
‖v2‖can
+
(
2‖m2‖Nm2 + 6tn+ t
√
3n
)
‖v1‖can
+ 3 ‖v1‖can ‖v2‖can + t
√
3n
q
· (12n)
3/2 − 1√
12n− 1 +
6
√
3t
q
nσ(`+ 1)w .
Of the five summands appearing this formula, the first two are by far the most
significant ones. The parameter w only affects the running time, so when that
is not a concern we can assume it to be small. This makes the last term small
compared to the first two. Since ‖mi‖ ≤ t/2, and Nmi ≤ n, we find the following
simple estimate:
‖vmult‖can . 14tn max {‖v1‖can , ‖v2‖can} . (1)
In this paper we are restricting our considerations to a situation where the
native SIMD functionality (batching) of the scheme [41] is not used, in which
case it is possible to choose the parameters so that rt(q) = 1. Furthermore,
in practice ‖m‖  t/2 when encoding integers or rational numbers using the
encoders described in [21, 14, 16, 7]. This implies that the first term in the initial
noise estimate of Lemma 3 is small, yielding the following simpler estimate:
‖vinitial‖can . 42σtn
q
. (2)
7
4 The New Scheme
4.1 Hat Encoder
Before describing the new scheme, we need to introduce a variant of the integer
encoder of [14].
Let m ∈ M be a plaintext element, considered in the symmetric inter-
val [−dbn/2e, bbn/2c]. When b > 2, denote by m̂ a polynomial whose coefficients
are the (symmetric representatives of) the base-b digits of m. When b = 2, we
use the binary digits of m, but augmented with the (repeating) sign. Note that
this is exactly the integer encoding discussed in [14]. Unfortunately, only bn con-
secutive integers can be represented in such a way as polynomials of degree at
most n−1, and we are left with one plaintext integer without an obvious encod-
ing. However, it suffices to allow the coefficients (in fact, at most one coefficient)
in the encodings to have absolute value up to (b+ 1)/2. This gives more room to
encode all elements of M, but also introduces non-uniqueness in the encodings.
This is not a problem, however, as evaluating any such encoding at x = b yields
the correct result modulo bn + 1. Furthermore, will only need the fact that ev-
ery element ofM has such an encoding of length at most n, with coefficients at
most (b+1)/2. For example, when b = 3 and n = 2, we can encode −5 as −x−2,
but also as −2x+ 1. For definiteness, we fix once and for all one such encoding
per each element of M.
Definition 2. Let m ∈M. For each m ∈M choose a shortest polynomial with
‖m̂‖ ≤ (b + 1)/2, such that m̂(b) = m modulo bn + 1, and denote it m̂. As was
explained above, such a polynomial m̂ always exists, and has degree at most n−1.
4.2 New (Leveled) Scheme
Let b ≥ 2 be an integer, and define the new plaintext space M = Z/(bn + 1)Z.
The parameters n, q, σ, w, `, and the ring Rq are as in the FV scheme (defined in
the full version [15]). The ciphertext space is the same as in FV, namely Rq×Rq.
We define
∆b =
⌊
− q
bn + 1
(xn−1 + bxn−2 + . . .+ bn−1)
⌉
.
The polynomial ∆b is analogous to the number ∆ appearing in the FV scheme.
The following set of algorithms describes our new leveled fully homomorphic
encryption scheme.
• SecretKeyGen : Output sk = FV.SecretKeyGen.
• PublicKeyGen(sk): Output pk = FV.PublicKeyGen(sk).
• EvaluationKeyGen(sk): Output evk = FV.EvaluationKeyGen(sk).
• Encrypt(pk,m ∈ M): Let pk = (p0, p1). Sample u with coefficients uniform
in {−1, 0, 1}, and e0, e1 ← χ. Let m̂ be an encoding of m, as described above.
Output ct = ([∆bm̂+ p0u+ e0]q, [p1u+ e1]q) ∈ Rq ×Rq.
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• Decrypt(sk, ct): Let s = sk and (c0, c1) = (ct[0], ct[1]). Compute M̂ =⌊
x−b
q [c0 + c1s]q
⌉
. Output m′ = M̂(b) ∈M.
We prove correctness of the above public-key encryption scheme in Sec-
tion 4.3. Security follows from exactly the same argument as for the FV scheme [22],
and is commented on in the full version [15].
For the new scheme, homomorphic addition is exactly the same as for FV:
• Add(ct0, ct1): Output FV.Add(ct0, ct1).
Multiplication again consists of two parts. The first part (Multiply′) forms
an intermediate three-component ciphertext ct′mult, just like in FV, which can
be converted back to size 2 using FV.Relinearize with evk, to form the final
two-component output ciphertext ctmult.
• Multiply′(ct0, ct1): Denote (c0, c1) = ct0 and (d0, d1) = ct1. Compute
c′0 =
[⌊
x−b
q c0d0
⌉]
q
, c′1 =
[⌊
x−b
q (c0d1 + c1d0)
⌉]
q
, and c′2 =
[⌊
x−b
q c1d1
⌉]
q
,
and output ct′mult = (c
′
0, c
′
1, c
′
2) ∈ Rq ×Rq ×Rq.
• Relinearize(ct′, evk): Output FV.Relinearize(ct′, evk).
• Multiply(ct0, ct1, evk): Output Relinearize(Multiply′(ct0, ct1)) ∈ Rq×
Rq.
4.3 Correctness
We use the following variant of Definition 1 to analyze the performance and
correctness of the public-key encryption scheme.
Definition 3 (Invariant noise). Let ct = (c0, c1) be a ciphertext encrypting
the message m ∈ M. Its invariant noise v ∈ RQ is the polynomial with the
smallest infinity norm such that
x− b
q
ct(s) =
x− b
q
(c0 + c1s) = m̂+ v + a(x− b) ∈ RQ ,
for some polynomial a ∈ R.
We now consider under what conditions decryption works correctly.
Lemma 6. The function Decrypt, as presented in Section 4.2, correctly de-
crypts a ciphertext ct encrypting a message m, as long as the invariant noise v
satisfies ‖v‖ < 1/2.
Proof. Let ct = (c0, c1). Using the formula for decryption, we have for some
polynomial A:
M̂ =
⌊
x− b
q
[c0 + c1s]q
⌉
=
⌊
x− b
q
(c0 + c1s+Aq)
⌉
= bm̂+ v + a(x− b)e+A(x− b) = m̂+ bve+ (A+ a)(x− b) .
As long as v is removed by the rounding, i.e. if ‖v‖ < 1/2, Decrypt outputs
m′ = M̂(b) = m̂(b) = m ∈M. uunionsq
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Next, we prove that the noise in a fresh encryption is small enough for correct
decryptions. First we need the following lemma. The proof is given in the full
version [15].
Lemma 7. Let ∆b be as defined above. Then ∆b(x − b) = q + ρ ∈ RQ, and
‖ρ‖ ≤ (b+ 1)/2.
Lemma 8 (Initial noise). Let ct = (c0, c1) be a fresh encryption of a mes-
sage m ∈ M. Let Nm denote an upper bound on the number of non-zero coeffi-
cients in m̂. The noise v in ct satisfies the bound
‖v‖ ≤ 1
q
(
b+ 1
2
)2
Nm +
b+ 1
q
B(2n+ 1) .
Proof. See the full version [15]. uunionsq
Note that Nm ≤ n in any case. We combine Lemma 6 and Lemma 8 to obtain
correctness for the public-key encryption scheme.
Theorem 1. The public-key encryption scheme defined by the algorithms Se-
cretKeyGen, PublicKeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt, is correct as long as the
parameters are chosen so that
1
q
(
b+ 1
2
)2
n+
b+ 1
q
B(2n+ 1) <
1
2
.
uunionsq
In the remaining of this section, we present two lemmas stating the correct-
ness of homomorphic addition and multiplication. For the proofs of the lemmas,
we refer the reader to the full version [15].
Lemma 9 (Addition). Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts encrypting m1,m2 ∈
M, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Then ctadd = Add(ct1, ct2) encrypts
the sum m1 +m2 ∈M, and has noise vadd, such that ‖vadd‖ ≤ ‖v1‖+ ‖v2‖.
Lemma 10 (Multiplication). Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts encrypting
m1,m2 ∈M, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Let Nm1 and Nm2 be upper
bounds on the number of non-zero terms in the polynomials m̂1 and m̂2, respec-
tively. Then ctmult = Multiply(ct1, ct2, evk) encrypts the product m1m2 ∈M,
and has noise vmult, such that
‖vmult‖ ≤ b+ 1
2
(Nm1 + n
2 + 2n)‖v2‖+ b+ 1
2
(Nm2 + n
2 + 2n)‖v1‖
+ 3n‖v1‖‖v2‖+ (b+ 1)B
q
(1 + n+ n2) +
b+ 1
q
nB(`+ 1)w .
5 Homomorphic Operations
In this section we present heuristic noise growth estimates of homomorphic ad-
dition and multiplication analogous to those in Section 3.2.
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5.1 Heuristic Estimates
In this section we present heuristic upper bounds for the noise growth in the
new scheme, just like we did for FV in Section 3.2, and as was motivated in Sec-
tion 3.1. Again, we use the canonical norm ‖·‖can instead of the usual infin-
ity norm ‖ · ‖ for the same reasons as in Section 3.2: essentially, it allows to
prove much more accurate heuristic estimates for the noise growth in multipli-
cation. We will present these results, but omit the proofs, as they are simple
modifications of the proofs of Lemma 8, Lemma 9, and Lemma 10 combined
with Lemma 2.
Lemma 11 (Initial noise heuristic). Let ct be a fresh encryption of a mes-
sage m ∈ M. Let Nm denote an upper bound on the number of non-zero coeffi-
cients in m̂. The noise v in ct satisfies the bound
‖v‖can ≤ 1
q
(
b+ 1
2
)2
2
√
3nNm +
6σ(b+ 1)
q
(
4
√
3n+
√
n
)
,
with very high probability.
Lemma 12 (Addition heuristic). Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts en-
crypting m1,m2 ∈ M, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Then ctadd =
Add(ct1, ct2) encrypts the sum m1 + m2 ∈ M, and has noise vadd, such that
‖vadd‖can ≤ ‖v1‖can + ‖v2‖can.
Lemma 13 (Multiplication heuristic). Let ct1 and ct2 be two ciphertexts
encrypting m1,m2 ∈ M, and having noises v1, v2, respectively. Let Nm1 and
Nm2 be upper bounds on the number of non-zero terms in the polynomials m̂1
and m̂2, respectively. Then
ctmult = Multiply(ct1, ct2, evk)
encrypts the product m1m2 ∈M, and has noise vmult, such that
‖vmult‖can ≤ (b+ 1)
(
Nm1 + 6n+
√
3n
)
‖v2‖can
+ (b+ 1)
(
Nm2 + 6n+
√
3n
)
‖v1‖can
+ 3 ‖v1‖can ‖v2‖can + b+ 1
q
√
3n
(
1 +
√
12n+ 12n
)
+
6
√
3(b+ 1)
q
nσ(`+ 1)w ,
with very high probability.
Of the five summands appearing this formula, the first two are again by far
the most significant ones. As before, the parameter w only affects the running
time, so when that is not a concern we can assume it to be small. This makes the
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last term small compared to the first two. Since Nmi ≤ n, we find the following
simple estimate:
‖vmult‖can . 14(b+ 1)n max {‖v1‖can , ‖v2‖can} . (3)
For the initial noise, we again use Nm ≤ n to obtain
‖vinitial‖can . (b+ 1)
2n3/2
q
. (4)
6 Fractional Encoder
The fractional encoder introduced by Dowlin et al. in [21] (see also [14, 20]) is a
convenient way of encoding and encrypting fixed-precision rational numbers, and
can be used in conjunction with many RLWE-based homomorphic encryption
schemes. In this section we construct a fractional encoder based on theirs to be
used in conjunction with the new scheme.
6.1 Abstract Fractional Encoder
For the new scheme, and in fact for any homomorphic encryption scheme whose
plaintext space is a ring M, we can abstract out the functionality of encoding
fractional numbers as a triple (P, Encode, Decode), where P is a finite subset
of Q, and
Encode : P →M , Decode : Encode(P)→ P
are maps satisfying Decode(Encode(x)) = x, for all x ∈ P.
To preserve the homomorphic property, we additionally require that when
x, y, x+ y, xy ∈ P, then
Encode(x+ y) = Encode(x) + Encode(y),
Encode(xy) = Encode(x)Encode(y) .
In our case we haveM = Z/(bn+1)Z, so a natural candidate for a fractional
encoding map that satisfies the homomorphic properties would be
Encode : P →M, Encode
(
x
y
)
= xy−1 mod (bn + 1) . (5)
However, P needs to chosen carefully to make this map both well-defined and
injective. For example, it is clearly undefined when gcd(y, bn+1) > 1. We resolve
these issues below, presenting appropriate choices for P.
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6.2 Case of Odd b
When b is odd, we prove that
P =
{
c+
d
bn/2
: c, d ∈
[
−b
n/2 − 1
2
,
bn/2 − 1
2
]
∩ Z
}
makes the map Encode presented above well-defined and injective, and thus
invertible in its range.
Lemma 14. The map Encode : P →M in (5) is injective.
Proof. Suppose c+ d/bn/2 = c′+ d′/bn/2 mod (bn + 1). Then (c− c′)bn/2 + (d−
d′) = k(bn + 1) for some integer k. However, we have∣∣∣(c− c′)bn/2 + (d− d′)∣∣∣ ≤ (bn/2 − 1)bn/2 + (bn/2 − 1) = bn − 1 < bn + 1 .
Thus k = 0, and cbn/2 + d = c′bn/2 + d′. Dividing both sides by bn/2 proves the
claim. uunionsq
We define Decode as the left inverse of Encode in its range. We derive a simple
description for Decode below. As usual, [y]a denotes reduction of the integer y
modulo a in the symmetric interval [−d(a− 1)/2e, b(a− 1)/2c].
Lemma 15. For z ∈ Encode(P), Decode(z) = b−n/2[zbn/2]bn+1.
Proof. Assume z = Encode(y), with y = c + d/bn/2. By definition of Encode,
zbn/2 = ybn/2 = cbn/2 + d mod (bn + 1). It follows from definition of P, that
|cbn/2 + d| ≤ (bn − 1)/2. Hence [zbn/2]bn+1 = cbn/2 + d, and dividing both sides
by bn/2 yields the result. uunionsq
6.3 Case of Even b
When b is odd, we can encode fractions with n/2 integral base-b digits, and n/2
fractional base-b digits. When b is even, due to technical constraints, we need to
reduce either the number of fractional digits or the number of integral digits by
one. Suppose we reduce the number of fractional digits by one, and set
P =
{
c+
d
bn/2−1
: |c| ≤ (b
n/2 − 1)b
2(b− 1) , |d| ≤
(bn/2−1 − 1)b
2(b− 1) , c, d ∈ Z
}
.
We prove that this makes the map Encode presented above well-defined and
injective, and thus invertible in its range.
Lemma 16. The map Encode : P →M in (5) is injective.
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Proof. Suppose c+d/bn/2−1 = c′+d′/bn/2−1 mod (bn+1). Then (c−c′)bn/2−1+
(d− d′) = k(bn + 1) for some integer k. However, we have∣∣∣(c− c′)bn/2−1 + (d− d′)∣∣∣ ≤ b
b− 1
[
(bn/2 − 1)bn/2−1 + bn/2−1 − 1
]
=
b
b− 1
(
bn−1 − 1) ≤ bn − b < bn + 1.
Thus k = 0, and cbn/2−1 + d = c′bn/2−1 + d′. Dividing both sides by bn/2−1
proves the claim. uunionsq
Note that if we do not reduce the number of digits by one, then Lemma 16 might
fail. Namely, if we have n/2 digits for both the integral and fractional parts, then
the equation in the proof becomes (c − c′)bn/2 + (d − d′) = k(bn + 1), and the
inequality becomes ∣∣∣(c− c′)bn/2 + (d− d′)∣∣∣ ≤ b
b− 1(b
n − 1) ,
where the right-hand side can now be greater than or equal to bn + 1.
We now derive a simple expression for Decode.
Lemma 17. For z ∈ Encode(P), Decode(z) = b−(n/2−1)[zbn/2−1]bn+1.
Proof. Assume z = Encode(y), with y = c+ d/bn/2−1. By definition of Encode,
zbn/2−1 = ybn/2−1 = cbn/2−1 + d mod (bn + 1). It follows from the definition
of P, that ∣∣∣cbn/2−1 + d∣∣∣ ≤ bn − b
2(b− 1) <
bn + 1
2
.
Hence [zbn/2−1]bn+1 = cbn/2−1 + d, and dividing both sides by bn/2−1 yields the
result. uunionsq
As an example, let n = 8, b = 10, and y = 12.55. Since 100−1 = −106
mod (108 + 1), z = Encode(y) =
[−1255 · 106]
108+1
= 45000013. For the pur-
poses of encryption, we need to also compute the polynomial encoding ẑ =
−5x7− 5x6 +x+ 2. Decryption evaluates this polynomial (or—more correctly—
a polynomial equal to it modulo x − 10) at x = 10. Of course, this gives back
the number 45000013 mod (108 + 1), which decoding converts to
Decode(z) =
[
45000013 · 103]
108+1
103
= 12.55 .
7 Comparison to FV
In this section we present a performance comparison of the new scheme with
the FV scheme. Since the schemes have very different properties, how such a
comparison should be performed in a fair and realistic way is not immediately
obvious. Thus, we start by describing and motivating the methodology, after
which we present the comparison, and finally summarize the results.
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7.1 Methodology
To make a comparison of FV and the new scheme meaningful, we need to fix
on a specific computational task, which both schemes can perform reasonably
well. For such a task, we choose the evaluation of a “regular circuit”, as described
in [20]. Such a regular circuit is parametrized by three integers A, D, and L, and
consists of evaluating A levels of additions, followed by one level of multiplication,
iterated D times. The inputs to the circuit are integers in the interval [−L,L].
Note that such a regular circuit has (multiplicative) depth D. For a fair compar-
ison, and to illustrate the different cases, we consider A ∈ {0, 3, 10}, with inputs
of size L ∈ {28, 216, 232, 264, 2128}, and try to find the largest possible D.
Since FV does not natively encrypt integers, we choose to use the NAF en-
coder [16], which performs better than the integer encoders of [14]. The main
challenge with using FV is the plaintext polynomial coefficient growth, which
quickly forces a very large t to be used, causing faster noise growth, and subse-
quently restricting the depth of the circuits. In all settings that we considered,
we did not get even close to filling the plaintext polynomial space up to the top
coefficient. Since the only advantage of using a higher base (as in [14]) in the
encoding process is that the encodings are shorter, we are not losing anything
by restricting to the NAF encoder.
Since the security of FV and the new scheme are based on exactly the same
parameters, it suffices to fix σ, and settle on a set of pairs (n, q) with desired
security properties. We choose to use the parameter sets presented in [14], which
are estimated [3] to have a high security level5. We also include a set that is one
step larger than these, namely (n = 32768, q ≈ 2890), as such parameter sizes
can still be considered practical. For all parameters we use σ = 3.19, which is a
standard choice [34, 14].
Having all of the above settled, the strategy is fairly simple. We use the
heuristic upper bound estimates for noise growth, as presented in Section 3.2
for FV, and in Section 5.1 for the new scheme, to find optimal tuples (t,D) for
FV, and tuples (b,D) for the new scheme, such that the depth D of the regular
circuit is maximized, while ensuring correctness. Next, we discuss the inequalities
imposed by these constraints for both schemes.
FV. Using (2), (1), and Lemma 4, we can bound the noise after the evaluation
of a regular circuit with parameters A and D by (approximately)(
14tn 2A
)D 42σtn
q
.
For correctness, this needs to be less than 1/2, which gives us the heuristic depth
estimate
D .
⌊
log q − log(84σtn)
log(14tn) +A
⌋
. (6)
5 In this paper, all estimates of the security level λ were obtained using commit
cc5f6e8 of the LWE estimator [3] which considers the most recent attacks, e.g. [1, 2].
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We use the analysis of [16] (see also [20]) to bound the coefficient growth in
the plaintext polynomials. One can show that the length of the NAF encoding
of integers of absolute value up to L is bounded by blogLc+ 2, of which at most
d = d(blogLc+ 2) /2e are non-zero. For correct decoding, [16] proves that we
need √
6
pi2Dd(d+ 2)
(d+ 1)2
D
2A(2
D+1−2) < t/2 . (7)
We also need to ensure that the plaintext polynomial does not wrap around
xn + 1, resulting in the condition (blogLc + 2) · 2D ≤ n − 1, but this bound
has no effect in any of the experiments we run, as was already pointed out
in Section 7.1, and can easily be verified from the results. It therefore suffices to
search for a t, that yields a maximum depth D, satisfying only the coefficient
growth condition (7), and the noise condition (6).
New scheme. For the new scheme, using (4), (3), and Lemma 12, we can bound
the noise after the evaluation of a regular circuit with parameters A and D by
(approximately) (
14(b+ 1)n 2A
)D (b+ 1)2n3/2
q
.
For correctness, this needs to be less than 1/2, which gives us the heuristic depth
estimate
D .
⌊
log q − log (2(b+ 1)2n3/2)
log(14(b+ 1)n) +A
⌋
. (8)
We also get a restriction from the plaintext wrapping around bn + 1. The
output of the regular circuit has absolute value bounded by (see [20]) V =
L2
D
2A(2
D+1−2), so for correctness it is necessary that V ≤ (bn − 1)/2, which
yields
D .
⌊
log
(
log
(
(bn − 1)22A−1)
log (22AL)
)⌋
≈
⌊
log
(
n log b+ 2A− 1
2A+ logL
)⌋
. (9)
Combining (9) with the noise condition (8) yields, for a fixed b, the overall bound
D . min
{⌊
log
(
n log b+ 2A− 1
2A+ logL
)⌋
,
⌊
log q − log (2(b+ 1)2n3/2)
log(14(b+ 1)n) +A
⌋}
.
7.2 Results
Our results for maximizing D are summarized in Fig. 1, and presented in more
detail in the full version [15]. These results show that, for performing encrypted
arithmetic on both small and large integers, the new scheme significantly out-
performs the FV scheme with the NAF encoding. The difference becomes par-
ticularly strong when more additions are performed at each level, as FV suffers
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from the coefficient growth resulting from these multiplications. For example,
when A = 10 the FV scheme allows us to evaluate regular circuits of depth at
most 3, even with the smallest input size that we considered, whereas with the
new scheme we can go up to depth 15; this is a massive increase in performance.
Fig. 1. Comparing maximum depthD between the FV scheme with NAF encoding, and
the new scheme; at each level the circuit has 2A additions followed by a multiplication.
Results are given for A ∈ {0, 3, 10}, and input sizes L ∈ {28, 232, 2128}.
We would also like to point out that the parameters we used in our com-
parison are estimated [3] to have a very high security level against the most
recent attacks. In some sense, the new scheme will perform better in comparison
to FV when using lower-security parameters: for a fixed n and σ, a lower secu-
rity level corresponds to using a larger q, which has a smaller initial noise. Thus,
there is more room for homomorphic operations noise-wise. This is in many cases
great for the new scheme, allowing deeper circuits to be evaluated. In the FV
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scheme, increasing the depth requires t to be substantially larger, which directly
affects the noise growth in homomorphic multiplications, and quickly makes any
increase in the noise ceiling irrelevant.
7.3 Rational Number Arithmetic
Even though the comparison above focused on integer arithmetic, a generaliza-
tion to rational number inputs, with a generalization of the NAF or other integer
encoders being used with the FV scheme, would yield similar results. The rea-
son for this is explained in detail in [20]: integer operations on scaled plaintexts
are essentially equivalent to performing computations using the fractional en-
coders, including the one described in Section 6. The difference between scaling
to integers and using fractional encoders is very minor, and is explained in [14].
Instead, the benefit of using fractional encoders is mostly for convenience, as it
frees the user from having to keep track of different scaling factors. Thus, the
performance of integer arithmetic is exactly the same as the performance of ra-
tional number arithmetic. For example, computations on 64-bit integer inputs
has the same performance as computations on rational numbers with e.g. 32-bit
fractional and 32-bit integral parts.
8 Applications
The applications of homomorphic encryption on integral or rational number data
are numerous. Recently, several papers have discussed applications to medical
risk prediction [10], genomic analysis [32, 16], evaluating neural networks on en-
crypted images [27], and performing predictive analysis on power consumption in
smart grids [8, 7]. A common challenge in works of this type is the growth of the
plaintext polynomial coefficients, which is commonly solved either by increasing
all of the parameters, or by using several smaller relatively prime plaintext poly-
nomial coefficient moduli, and performing the computations separately using
each of these: the final result can then be obtained using the Chinese Remainder
Theorem coefficient-wise in the plaintext space (e.g. [27, 8]). However, with the
new scheme, the situation is much better. We illustrate this by discussing the
works [32] and [16]. Further examples can be found in the full version [15].
The works [32] and [16] implement medical risk prediction tasks using lo-
gistic regression, and the Cox Proportional Hazard model. Both models require
non-polynomial functions to be evaluated, which the authors solve by using Tay-
lor [32] and minimax [16] approximations. For example, for evaluating logistic
regression models, [16] uses polynomials up to degree 11 evaluated on high-
precision rational number inputs. This forces them to use very large parameters:
their polynomial modulus has degree 23430, yielding an acceptable estimated
security level λ ≈ 113. With the new scheme such computations can be done
easily with only n = 4096, and an estimated security level of λ ≈ 120.
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